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TIE WAR POWER AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
MILITARY FORCES.
GEORGE MELLING,

LL. M., Office of Judge Advocate General,
U. S. Navy.

Many questions, prompted by existing military activities in this
country and abroad, are now. the subject of general discussion, concerning the respective powers of the President and the Congress of
the United States, the government of conquered territory, the trial of
civilians by military courts, status of the militia, and so forth.
While in these discussions the question involved is frequently
treated as new, in most instances the precise point has been repeatedly
decided by the courts of our own country. Thus, for example, the
-power of the President to use the military forces of the United States
against a'foreign country prior to declaration of war by Congress,
the right of a successful enemy to govern inhabitants of conquered
territory during. wai, his right to'their allegiance, his right to try them
by military courts for any offenses, however serious, the status of the
militia, and the extenf to which it is subject to the call of the Presi'dent-these and numerous other questions of present day interest
were long 'go argued and decided -by the foremost lawyers and jurists
in this country.
It has accordir .y urcn deemed timely to publish in the military
law section of this Journal a digest of the authorities relating to the
various subjects indic,ted. 'This digest consists of extracts from a
publication entitled "Laws. Relating to the Navy, Annotated," which
the writer has in course of preparation, pursuant to a resolution of the
United States Senate.
The abbreviation "C. M. 0." refers to Court-Martial Orders published by
the Navy Department"
+Ihe file numbers cited refer to cases which form
part of the records -

.,i,

department.

POWERS OF CONGRESS UNDER ART. 1, SEC. 8, OF THE
CONSTITUTION
"Section 8. The Congress shall have power . . . to declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.'
Decisions under this section of the- Constitution naturally fall
under the following headings:
I. THE WAR POWER.
II.
III.

PROPERTY OF BELLIGERENTS.
ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF TERRITORY.

IV.

DIsCIPLINE OF ARMY.

V.

MARTIAL LAW.

PROCEEDINGS

I.

THE WAR POWER.

Power of Congress to declare war and President's power as
Commander-in-Chief.-"Congress has the power not only to raise
and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore,
the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with
vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of
forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to
the President as Commander in Chief. Both these powers are derived
from the Constitution, but neither is defiried by that instrument. Their
extent must be determined by their nature and by the principles of our
institutions. The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress,
the power to execute in the President. Both powers imply many
subordinate and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authority essential
to its due exercise. But neither can the President in war more than
in peace intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress
upon the proper authority of the President. Both are servants of the
people, whose will is expressed in the.fundamental ls,v. Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President or any commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals
for the trial and punishment for offenses, either of soldiers or civilians,
unless in cases of a controlling necessity which ju stifies what it compels, or at least insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the
legislature." (Ex. parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 139, dissenting opinion
of four justices; see also Swaim v. U. S., 28 Ct. CIs., 173, 221,
affirmed, 165 U. S., 553; and see note to Art. II, sec. 2, clause 1.)
Power of President in advance of congressional action.-"If
a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting
for any special legislative authority." (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635.)
"Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander in
Chief in suppressing an insurrection has met with such armed hostile
resistance and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel
him to accord to them the character of belligerents is a question to be
decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and
acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was intrusted. He must determine what degree of force the
crisis demands. The proclamation of blockade is itself official and
conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed which
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demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the
circumstances peculiar to the case." (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635.)
"A state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration
of it by either party; and this is true of both a civil and a foreign
war." (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635.)
"That a foreign nation, or insurrectionary body of citizens, may
by invasion of the United States or by other acts bring about a condition of affairs which will warrant the President in declaring, in advance
of congressional legislation, that a state of war exists, was asserted
by the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases." (2 Willoughby Const.,
796.) [That power of declaring war is exclusive with Congress, see
Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind., 167. See also 14 Mich. Law Review, 473.]
"The question in the present case is, When did the Rebellion begin
and end? * * * The proclamation 6of intended blockade by the
President may, therefore, be assumed as narking the first of these
dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed as marking the
second." (The Protector, 12 Wall., 700.) [The President's proclamations of intended blockade were issued on April 19 and 27, 1861;
Congress formally declared war to exist on July 13, 1861, proclamations that the war had closed were issued on April 2 and August 20,

1866.]
Extent of war power.-"The measures to be taken in carrying
on war and to suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of
all such questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the
substantial powers involved are confided by the Constitution. In the
latter case the power is not limited to victories in the field and to the
dispersion of the insurrectionary forces. It carries with it inherently
the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict and
to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress."
(Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall., 493.)
II.

PROPERTY OF BELLIGERENTS.

Effect of declaration of war.-"The people of the two countries
become immediately the enemies of each other-all intercourse, commercial or otherwise, between them unlawful-all contracts existing
at the commencement of the war suspended, and all made during its
existence utterly void. The insurance of enemies' property, the drawing of bills of exchange or purchase on the enemies' country, the
remission of bills or money to it are illegal and void. Existing partnerships between citizens or subjects of the two countries are dissolved
and, in fine, interdiction of trade and intercourse, direct or indirect, is
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absolute and complete by the mere force and effect of war itself. All
the property of the people of the two countries on land or sea is
subject to capture and confiscation by the adverse party as enemies'
property, with certain qualifications as it respects property on land
(Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch, 110). All treaties between the belligerent
parties are annulled. The ports of the respective countries may be
blockaded, and letters of marque and reprisal granted as rights of war,
and the law of prizes as defined by the law of nations comes into
full and complete operation, resulting from maritime captures, jure
belli. War also effects a change in the mutual relations of all States
or countries, not directly, as in the case of belligerents, but immediately
and indirectly, though they have no part in the contest, but remain
neutral." (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 682, dissenting opinion Justice
Nelson; see also McCormick v. Humphrey, 27 Ind., 154; Perkins v.
Rogers, 35 Ind., 167.)
Confiscation of enemy property.--"War gives the right to confiscate but does not of itself confiscate the property of the enemy."
(Brown'v. U. S., 8 Cranch, 110; see also Britton v. Butler, 4 Fed. Cas.
No. 1903; Wagner v. Schooner Juanita,28 Fed. Cas. No. 17039; Miller
v, U. S., 11 Wall. 304; Brown v. Hiatt, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2011.)
"When war breaks out the question what shall be done with enemy
property in our country is a question rather of policy than of law. The
rule which we apply to the property of our enemy will be applied by
him to the property of our citizens. Like all other questions of policy
it is proper for the consideration of a department which can modify
it at will; not for the consideration of a department which can pursue
only the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the
legislature not of the executive or judiciary." (Brown v. U. S., 8
Cranch, 110.)
Authority of military commander to seize private property in
domestic territory.-"Private property may be taken by a military
commander to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy or
for the purpose of converting it to the use of the public; but the danger must be immediate and impending, or the necessity urgent for the
public service such as will not admit of delay and where the action of
the civil authority would be too late in providing the means which the
occasion calls for. The facts as they appeared to the officer must
furnish the rule for the application of these principles. But the officer
cannot take possession of private property for the purpose of insuring
the success of a distant expedition upon which he is about to march."
(Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How., 115.)
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Enemy Territory.--"If private property there [in conquered
territory] was taken by an officer 9,r a soldier of the occupying army,
acting in his military character, when by the laws of war or the proclamation of the commanding general it should have been exempt from
seizure, the owner could have complained to that commander, who
might have ordered restitution or sent the offending party before a
military tribunal as circumstances might have required, or he could
have had recourse to the Government for redress. But there can be
no doubt of the right of the Army to appropriate any property there,
although belonging to private individuals, which was necessary for its
support or convenient for its use. This was a belligerent right which
was not extinguished by the occupation of the country, although. the
necessity for its exercise was thereby lessened. However exempt
from seizure on other grounds private property there may have 'been,
it was always subject to be appropriated when required by the necessities or convenience of the Army, though the owner of property taken
in such case may have had a just claim against the Government for
indemnity." (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158, 167; compare, Heflebower v. U. S.; 21 Ct. Cls., 237; U. S. v. Pacific R. Co., 120 U. S.,
239; Alexander v. U. S. 39* Ct. Cls., 383; 13 Op. Atty. Gen. III;
Wiggin's Case, 3 Ct. Cis., 413.)
"Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond
a doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate
or impending danger in which private property may be impressed into
the public service or may be seized and appropriated to the public
use or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner.
* * * The rule is well settled that the officer taking private property
for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully proved, is not a trespasser and that the Government is bound to make ,full compensation
to the owner." (U. S. v. Russell, 13 Wall., 623.)
Status of inhabitants in enemy countryr.-"The district of
country declared by the constituted authorities during the late Civil
War to be in insurrection against the Government of the United States
was enemy territory, and all the people residing within such district
were, according to public law and for all purposes connected with the
prosecution of the war, liable to be treated by the United States, pending the war and while they remained within the lines of insurrection,
as enemies, without reference to their personal sentiments and dispositions." (Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S., 594.)
"It is said that, though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs. Alexander has no personal sympathy with the rebel cause and that her prop-
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erty therefore can not be regarded as enemy property; but the court
can not inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the
principle of public law so often announced by this bench as applicable
alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State
or district in insurrection against the United States must be regarded
as enemies until, by action of the Legislature and the executive, or
otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed."
* (Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404; see also, Miller v. U. S., 11
Wall, 268, sustaining laws providing for confiscation of private property owned by friendly as well as hostile inhabitants of the Confederate States.)

III.

AcguisITioN

AND GOVERNMENT

OF TERRITORY.

Power to acquire territory.--"The genius and character of our
institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the General Government to vindicate by arms if it
should become necessary its own rights and the rights of its citizens.
A war, therefore, declared by Congress can fiever be presumed to be
waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor
does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to
enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's
territory. The United States, it is true, may enlarge its boundaries
by cofiquest or treaty and may demand the cession of territory as a
condition of peace in order to indemnify its citizens for the injuries
they have suffered, or to reimburse the Government for the expense
of the war; but this can be done only by the treaty-making power or
the legislative authority, and is not a part of the power conferred upon
the President by the declaration of war. His duty and power are
.
.
He may invade the hostile country and
purely military. .
subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States; but
his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union nor extend
the operations of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before
assigned to them by the legislative power." (Fleming v. Page, 9
How., 603.)
"The Constitution confers absolutely upon the Government of the
Union the power of making war and of making treaties; consequently
that Government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by
conquest or treaty." (American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet., 511.)
"The war power and the treaty-making power each carries with it
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authority to acquire new territory." (Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall.,
493.)
"The power to acquire territory, either by conquest or treaty, is
vested by the Constitution in the United States." (U. S. v. Huckabee,
16 Wall., 414.)
The port of Tampico, Mexico, while in the military possession
of the United States and governed by its military authorities acting
under the orders of the President, was not a part of the United States
and did not cease to be a foreign country in the sense in which these
words are used in the acts of Congress. "It is true that when Tampico
had been captured and the state of Tamanlipas subjugated, other nations were bound to regard the country while our possession continued
as the territory of the United States and to respect it as such. * * *
As regards all other nations, it was a part of the United States and
belonged to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries. But yet it was not a part of this Union. For every
nation which acquires territory by treaty or conquest holds it according to its own institutions and laws. * * * The power of the
President under which Tampico and the state of Tamanlipas were
conquered and held in subjection was simply that of a military commander prosecuting a war waged against a public enemy by the authority of his Government." Tampico therefore continued to be a foreign
port, "nor did our laws extend over it." (Fleming v. Page, 9 How.,
603.)
Status of Porto Rico while under military government previous to
ratification of treaty of peace ceding the island to the United States:
"During this period the United States and Porto Rico were still foreign countries with respect to each other. * * * The fact that
notwithstanding the military occupation of the United States, Porto
Rico remained a foreign country within the revenue laws is established by the case of Fleming v. Page." (Dooley v. U. S., 182 U. S.,

222.)
"Cuba is none the less foreign territory, within the meaning of the
act of Congress because it is under a military government appointed
by and representing the President in the work of assisting the inhabitants of the island to establish a government of their own under
which as a free and independent people they may control their own
affairs without interference by other nations." As between the United
States and all foreign nations, Cuba was to be treated as if it were
conquered territory. "But as between the United States and Cuba,
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that island is territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba, to
whom it rightfully belongs." (Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S., 109.)
Government of conquered territory during war.--By the conquest and military occupation of the port of Castine, Me., by the British during the War of 1812, "the enemy acquired that firm possession
which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over
that place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory
was, of course, suspended and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the
British Government and were bound by such laws, and such only, as
it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no
other laws could be obligatory upon them; for where there is no protection or allegiance or sovereignty there can be no claim to obedience." (U. S. v. Rice, 4 Wheat, 246.)
"Although the city of New Orleans was conquered and taken possession of in a civil war waged on the part of the United States to put
down an insurrection and restore the supremacy of the National Government in the Confederate States, that Government had the same
power and rights in territory held by conquest as if the territory had
belonged to a foreign country and had been subjugated in a foreign
war. . . . In such cases the conquering power has a right to
displace the pre-existing authority and to assume to such an extent
as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and
functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers
and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller, according
to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues, to be paid and apply
them to its own use or otherwise. It may do anything necessary to
strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the
powers that may be exerted in such cases save those which are found
in the laws and usages of war. * * * In such cases the laws of war
take the place of the Constitution and laws of the United States as
applied in time of peace." (New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co.,
20 Wall., 387; Dooley v. U. S., 182 U, S., 222.)
"While his [military commander's] power is necessarily despotic,
this must be understood rather in an administrative than in a legislative sense. While in legislating for a conquered country he may disregard the laws of that country, he is not wholly above the laws of
his own. * * * His power to administer would be absolute, but his
power to legislate would not be without certain restrictions-in other
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words, they would not extend beyond the necessities of the case.
* * * It was said that the courts established in Mexico during the
war 'were nothing more than the agents of the military power to assist
it in preserving order in the conquered territory and to protect the
inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by
the American arms. They were subject to the military power and
their decisions under its control whenever the commanding officer
thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United
States and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of 'prize or no
prize,' although Congress in the exercise of its general authority in
relation to the national courts would have power to validate their
action." (Dooley v. U. S., 182 U: S., 222.)
"So long as the war continued it can not be denied that he [the
President] might institute temporary governments in insurgent districts occupied by the national forces or take measures in any States
for the restoration of State governments faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts only such means and agents as were
authorized by constitutional laws." (Texas v. White, 7. Wall, 700.)
"The municipal laws-that is, such as affect private rights of
persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime-are
generally allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation.
They are considered as continuing unless suspended or superseded by
the occupying belligerent." (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158.)
"While we see no reason to doubt the conclusion of the court
that the port of Tampico [during its occupation by the United States
in the Mexican War] 'was still a foreign port, it is not perceived why
the fact that there was no act of Congress establishing a customhouse
there or authorizing the appointment of a collector should have prevented the collector appointed by the military commander from granting the usual documents required to be issued to a vessel engaged in"
the coasting trade. A collector, though appointed by a military commander, may be presumed to have the ordinary power of a collector
under an act of Congress, with authority to grant clearances to ports
within the United States, though, of course, he would have no power
to make a domestic port of what was in reality a foreign port." (De
Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1.)
Government of conquered and ceded territory after war.-See
note to Art. IV, set. 3, clause 2.
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IV. DISCIPLINE OF ARMY.
Jurisdiction over persons in military service during war."Thb question here is, What is the law which governs an army invading an enemy's country? It is not the civil law of the invaded country.
It is not the civil law of the conquering country. It is military lawthe law of war-and its supremacy for the protection of the officers
and soldiers of the Army when in service in the field in the enemy's
country is as essential to the efficiency of the Army as -the supremacy
of the civil law at home and in time of peace is essential to the preservation of liberty." (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158, 170.)
"This doctrine of nonliability to the tribunals of the invaded
country for acts of warfare is as applicable to members of the Confederate Army when in Pennsylvania as to members of the National
Army when in the insurgent States. The officers or soldiers of
neither Army could be called to account civilly or criminally in those
tribunals for such acts, whether those acts resulted in the destruction
of property or the destruction of life. Nor could they be required
- by those tribunals to explain or justify their conduct upon any averment of the injured party that the acts complained of were unauthorized by the necessities of war." (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S.,
158, 169.)
Courts-martial did not have exclusive jurisdiction to try persons
in the Army for offenses punishable by State laws during the Civil
War while they were in States "occupying as members of the Union
their normal and constitutional relation to the Federal Government,
in which the supremacy of that Government was recognized and the
civil courts were open and in the undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction. When the armies of the United States were in the territory
of insurgent States, banded together in hostility to the National Government, and making war against iTt-in other words, when the
armies of the United States were in the enemy's country-the military
tribunals mentioned had under the laws of war and the authority conferred by the section named exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish
offenses of every grade committed by persons in the military service.
Officers and soldiers of the armies of the Union were not subject during the war to the laws of the enemy or amenable to his tribunals for
offenses committed by them. They were answerable only to their own
Government and only by its laws as enforced by its armies could they
be punished. * * * The fact that when the offense was committed
for which the defendant was indicted the State of Tennessee was in
the military occupation of the United States with a military governor
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at its head appointed by the President cannot alter this conclusion.
Tennessee was one of the insurgent States forming the organization
known as the Confederate States, against which the war was waged.
IHer territory was enemy's country, and its character in this respect
was not changed until long afterward. * * * The laws of the
State. for the punishment of crime were continued in force only for
the 'protection and benefit of its own people." (Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U. S., 513, $15; see also Tennessee v. Hibdom, 23 Fed. Rep., 795;
24 Op. Atty. Gen., 570.)
When the armies of the United States ate in the enemy's country
the established military tribunals of the United States have under the
laws of war and statutory authority exclusive jurisdiction to try and
punish offenses of every grade committed by persons in the military
service. (24 Op. Atty. Gen., 570, citing Coleman v. Tennessee, 97

U. s., 509.)
"While it is true that the jurisdiction of military tribunals is not
exclusive in time of peace and in territory where the supremacy of the
United States is recognized and the relations between the local government and the National Government normal, and where also the
exercise of jurisdiction of the local civil courts is not disturbed, it is
equally true that when the armies of the United States are in hostile
territory, and as in the present case engaged in actual warfare, the
jurisdiction of such tribunals over such offenses is exclusive; and it
is evident from the decisions cited that in reference to the present
question [Philippine insurrection] the country was none the less
'enemy's country' and the territory hostile because it was harassed by
insurrection against a sovereignty perfect in law rather than attacked
or defended by a recognized belligerent." (24 Op. Atty. Gen., 570.)
"It is well settled that a foreign army permitted to march through
a friendly country or to be stationed in it by authority of its sovereign
or government is exempt from its civil and criminal jurisdiction.
* * * Much more must this exemption prevail where a hostile
army invades an enemy's country. There would be something singularly absurd in permitting an officer or soldier of an invading army
to be tried by his enemy whose country it had invaded. The same
reasons for his exemption from criminal prosecution apply to civil
proceedings. There would be as much incongruity and as little likelihood of freedom from the irritations of the war in civil as in criminal
proceedings prosecuted during its continuance. In both instances,
from the very nature of war the tribunals of the enemy must be without jurisdiction to sit in judgment upon the military conduct of the
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officers and soldiers of the invading army * * *. It is manifest
that if officers or soldiers of the army could be required to leave their
posts and troops upon the summons of every local tribunal on pain
of a judgment by default against them which at the termination of
hostilities could be enforced by suit in their own States, the efficiency
of the army as a hostile force would be utterly destroyed." (Dow v.
Johnson, 100 U. S., 158, 165.)
"Nor is the position of the invading belligerent affected or his
relation to the local tribunals changed by his temporary occupation and
The
domination of any portion of the enemy's country
municipal laws-that is, such as affect private rights of persons and
property and provide for the punishment of crime-are generally
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are
considered as continuing unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent. But their continued enforcement is not for the protection or control of the army or its officers or soldiers. These remain
subject to the laws of war and are responsible for their conduct only
to their own government and the tribunals by which those laws are
administered. If guilty of wanton cruelty to persons or of unnecessary spoliation of property or of other acts not authorized by the laws
of war they may be tried and punished by the military tribunals. They
are amenable to no other tribunal except that of public opinion, which
it is to be hoped will always brand with infamy all who authorize or
sanction acts of cruelty and oppression." (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S.,
158; see also 24 Op. Atty. Gen., 570.)
An officer of the Army may be sued in the courts of the United
States for unauthorized seizure of the property of a citizen traveling
with the Army as a trader during the war with Mexico. "The trespass
was committed out of the limits of the United States. But an action
may be maintained in the circuit court for any district in which the
defendant may be found upon process against him where the citizenship of the respective parties gives jurisdiction to a court of the
United States." (Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How., 115.)
The validity of a seizure by a United States officer in command
of troops while in an insurgent State could not be tried in a municipal
court'in a common-law proceeding, where the property seized belonged
to an enemy, as such seizure was, an act of war and no action can be
maintained in such court against the captor of booty. This conclusion
does not conflict with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mitchell v.
Harmony, as there the, property in question belonged to a citizen and
not to an enemy. (Coolidge v. Guthrie, 6 Fed. Cas., No. 3185.)
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An officer of the Federal Army was sued in New Orleans for
seizure of private property by a subordinate officer under his authority, alleged to be a wanton abuse of power. Judgment was entered
against defendant, with interest and costs. Suit was brought on this
judgment in the Federal Court for the District of Maine and judgnrent entered by that court for $2,659.67 and costs. This was reversed
by the Supreme Court on ground that lower courts were without
jurisdiction.' (Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158.)
An officer in the Army of the United States who, while operating
in the Philippines during the insurrection in those islands and while
the government of military occupation was in force therein, committed
homicide against a native of those islands, was amenable only to the
laws of war and could not be tried by the civil courts of those islands
or of the United States; and having left the military service, he could
not be tried for the offense by a military court. A court-martial has
no jurisdiction over an officer after he has left the service, and a
military commission has no jurisdiction to try such officer after peace
has been proclaimed. (24 Op. Atty. Gen., 570.) [While the United
States was not at war with any recognized power during the Philippine insurrection, nevertheless a state of war existed for certain purposes as to all the military forces of the United States directly engaged
in the suppression of said insurrection (7 Comp. Dec., 345) ; see note
to sec. 290, Revised Statutes.]
An officer of United States Volunteers was charged with having
deliberately murdered a brother officer during the Mexican War at a
place in Mexico occupied by the United States troops and under the
jurisdiction of the United States. He escaped to the United States
during the progress of his trial by a military commission. Held, that
he could not be tried by any civil court of the United States; and the
volunteer forces to which he belonged having been disbanded and
mustered out of the service, he could not be brought to trial by a
military court as for a military offense. "However much it is to be
regretted that the extraordinary case of Captain Foster should escape
a judicial or military investigation, it is of infinitely higher moment
that the constitutional principles of the Government. as wisely expounded by the judiciary should be upheld and enforced. If the
country hereafter should be likely to be placed in circumstances under
'which a similar case might arise, Congress can easily provide against
a recurrence of the difficulties of the present case." (5 Op. Atty.
Gen., 55.)

PROCEEDINGS
V.

MARTIAL LAW.

Military jurisdiction over civilians in time of war.-"There are
under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: One to be
exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of
foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time
of rebellion and civil war within the States or districts occupied by
rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of
invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or
during rebellion within the limits of States maintaining adhesion to the
National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise.
The first of these may be called jurisdiction under the military law,
and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of war,
or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the
second may be distinguished as military government, superseding, as
far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the
military commander, under the direction of the President, with the
express or implied sanction of Congress; while the third may be
denominated martial law proper, and is called into action by Congress
or temporarily when the action of Congress can not be invited, in the
case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of
insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or
localities whose ordinary law no longer adequately secures public
safety and private rights." (Ex parts Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, dissenting
opinion of four justices.)
Martial law is the law of military necessity in the actual presence of war. It is administered by the general of the Army, and
is in fact his will." (U. S. v. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520. For other
definitions, see 8 Op. Atty. Gen., 365; In re Egan, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,
303; In re Ezeta, 62 Fed. Rep., 972.)
"What has been called the paramount law of self-defense, common to all countries, has established the rule that whatever force is
necessary is also lawful. 'Whatever force is necessary for self-defense is also lawful. This law, applied nationally, is the martial law,
which is an offshoot of the common law, and although ordinarily dormant in peace, may be called forth by. insurrection or invasion.'
(Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. St., 165; 65 L. R. A., 193.)
"The right in the military officer to govern by martial law, as we
have said, arises upon the fact of existing or immediately impending
force at a given place and time, against legal authority, which the civil
authority is incompetent to overcome; and it is exercised precisely
upon the principle on which self-defense justifies the use of force by
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individuals. * * * That is, there are cases where force must be
resisted by force, instead of waiting for the civil authorities. * * *
This is the doctrine expressed by the maxim, inter arma silent leges;
* * * that is, that in the midst of actual force, for arma is used as
meaning force, the law is silent."

(Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind., 370.)

"As has been said by a distinguished civilian, 'when foreign invasion or civil war renders it impossible for courts of law to sit, or to
enforce the execution of their judgments, it becomes necessary to find
some rude substitute for them and to employ for that purpose the
military, which is the only remaining force in the community; and,
while the laws are silenced by the noise of arms, the rulers of the
armed force must punish, as equitably as they can, those crimes which
threaten their own safety and that of society; but no longer.' This
necessity must be shown affirmatively by the party assuming to exercise this extraordinary and irregular power over the life, liberty and
property of the citizen, whenever it is called in question." (In re
Egan, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4303.)
"Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicial process." (Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78.)
"Unquestionably a State may use its military power to put down
an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every government,
essential to the preservation of order and free institutions, and is as
necessary to the States of this, Union as to any other government.
The State itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the governmpent of Rhode Island deemed the armed
opposition so formidable and so ramified throughout the State as to
require the use of the military force and the declaration of martial
law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority. It was a state of war, and the established government resorted
to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself and to overcome the
unlawful opposition." (Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 1.)
"It is not unfrequently said that the community must be either
in a state of peace or war, as there is no intermediate state. But from
the point of view now under consideration this is an error. There
may be peace for all the ordinary purposes of life, and yet a state of
disorder, violence and danger in special directions, which, though not
technically war, has in its limited field the same effect, and if important enough to call for martial law for suppression is not distinguishable, so far as the powers of the commanding officer are concerned, from actual war. The condition in fact exists, and the law
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must recognize it, no matter how opinions may differ as to what it
should be more correctly called." (Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206
Pa. St., 165; 65 L. R. A., 193.)
Martial law "is called into action by Congress, or temporarily,
when the action of Congress can not be invited, in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President." (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall,
2; see also Despan v.Olney, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3822.)
"It is to be borne in mind that this power is not one to be exercised only by the highest officers of the Government, in whose hands
it might be exercised with moderation. It is claimed for the President
as Commander-in-Chief and as incident to a state of war. But if
it exists at all it exists as the law of war or martial law, and may be
exercised by the military officer in command of any district without
reference to his rank, as rightfully as by the President himself. He
might be afraid to exercise it without orders from his superior, but if
it exists at all it belongs to him as well as to the President." (Johnson
v.Jones, 44 Ill., 143; 92 Am. Dec., 159.)
Limitations upon exercise of martial law.-"Martial law can
not arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual
and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts
and deposes the civil administration. * * * There are occasions
when martial rule can be properly applied. If in foreign invasions or
civil war the courts are actually closed and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then on the theater of active
military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity
to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus overthrown, to
preserve the safety of the Army and society; and as no power is left
but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws
can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits
its duration, for if this government is continued after the courts are
reinstated it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never
exist where the courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed
exercise of their jurisdiction. It iq also confined to the locality of
actual war." (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2.)
"A citizen not connected with the military service and resident in
a State where the courts are open and in the proper exercise of their
jurisdiction can not, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than
by the ordinary courts of law." (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 3.)
The Federal authority having been unopposed in the State of Indiana and the Federal courts open for the trial of offenses and the
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redress of grievances, the usages of war could not, under the Constitution, afford any sanctum for the trial there of a citizen in civil life
not connected with the military or naval service by a military tribunal
for any offense whatever. "It is claimed that martial law covers, with
its br6ad mantle, the proceedings of this military commission. The
proposition is this: That in a time of war the commander of an armed
force (if in his opinion the exigencies of the country demand it and
of which he is the judge) has the power, within the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies and subject
citizens, as well as soldiers, to the rule of his will; and in the exercise
of his lawful authority can not be restrained except by.his superior
officer or the President of the United States. * * * Martial law
established on such a basis destroys every guaranty of the Constitution and effectually renders the 'military independent of and superior
to the civil power.' * * * Civil liberty and this kind of martial law
can not endure together. * * * It will b e borne in mind that this is
.not a question of the power to proclaim martial law when war exists
in a community and the courts and civil authorities are overthrown."
(Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 3, 124-127.)
Martial law is exercised in our country, the military being on the
spot to execute it where no civil authority exists; but where the civil
authority exists, the Constitution is imperative that it shall be paramount to the military." (Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind., 370.)
"Martial law is restricted to those places which are the theater of
war and to their immediate vicinity. Modified by the necessities of
war, it is obvious it can not operate beyond these bounds." (In re
Kemp, 16 Wis., 359.)
"Neither can even the 'Commander-in-Chief of the Army extend
martial law beyond the sphere of military operations. If he possessed
this power, in time of war or insurrection, over the whole extent of the
Nation, whether within the theater of military operations or not, the
political institutions and laws of the land would be entirely at his
mercy." (Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. (N. Y.), 563.)
"But when the civil courts, in the midst of loyal communities, are
exercising their ordinary jurisdiction, the appeal to the military arm
or to martial law is needless." (Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill., 143; 93 Am.
Dec., 159.)
See note to Article I, Section 8, Clause 13, "Civil responsibility
of persons in military service."
Effect of martial law.-When martial law is declared by a
State during a local insurrection, "the officers engaged in its military
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sevice might lawfully arrest anyone who, from the information before
them, they had reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the
insurrection, and might order a house to be forcibly entered and
searched when there were reasonable grounds for supposing he might
be there concealed. Without the power to do this, martial law and
the military array of the Government would be mere parade and rather
encourage attack than repel it." (Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 1.)
"The effect of martial law is to put into operation the powers and
methods vested in the commanding officer by military law. So far as
his powers for the preservation of order and security of life and property are concerned, there is no limit but the necessities and exigency
of the situation; and in this respect there is no difference between a
public war and domestic insurrection." (Commonwealth v. Shortall,
206 Pa. St., 165; 65 L. R. A., 193.)
Martial law "overrides and suppresses all existing civil laws, civil
officers, and civil authorities by the arbitrary exercise of military
power; and every citizen or subject, in other words, the entire population of the country, within the confines of its power, is subjected to
the mere will or caprice of the commander. He holds the lives, liberty, and property of all in the palm of his hand. Martial law is
regulated by no known or established system or code of laws, as it is
over and above all of them. The commander is the legislator, judge
and executioner. His order to the provost marshal is the beginning
and the end of the trial and condemnation of the accused. There may
be a hearing, or not, at his will. If permitted, it may be before a drumhead court martial or the more formal board of a military commission,
or both forms may be dispensed with and the trial and condemnation
be equally legal, though not equally humane and judicious." (In re
Egan, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4303.)
"The will of the military chief * * * is, subject to slight
limitations, the law of the military zone or theater of war. It is sometimes spoken of as a substitute for the civil law. It is said also that
the proclamation of martial law ousts or suspends the civil jurisdiction. These expressions are hardly accurate. The invasion or insurrection sets aside, suspends, and nullifies the actual operation of the
Constitution and laws. The guaranties of the Constitution as well as
the common law and statutes, and the functions and powers of the
courts and officers, become inoperative by virtue of the disturbance.
The proclamation of martial law simply recognizes the status or condition of things resulting from the invasion or insurrection and declares it. In sending the army into such territory to occupy it and
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execute the will of the military chief for the time being, as a means
of restoring peace and order, the executive merely adopts a method
of restoring and making effective the Constitution and laws within
that territory, in obedience to his sworn duty to support the Constitu-tion and execute the laws." (State v. Brown, 71 W. Va., 519, 521;
33 Ann. Cas., 2.)
"In most, if not all, of the instances in which the civil courts have
treated sentences of the military commissions as void, the commissions
acted and the sentences were pronounced in tranquil territory, not covered by any proclamation of martial law, in which there was no actual
war, in which the Constitution and laws were in full and unobstructed
operation." (State v. Brown, 71 W. Va., 519, 524; 33 Ann. Cas., 3.)
["In some parts of the country, during the War of 1812, our officers
made arbitrary arrests and by military tribunals tried citizens who
were not in the military service. These arrests and trials, when
brought to the notice of the courts, were uniformly condemned as
illegal." (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 128.) ]
"Power to establish a military commission for the punishment of
offenses committed within the military zone is challenged in argument; but we think such a commission is a recognized and necessary
incident and instrumentality of martial government. A mere power
of detention of offenders may be wholly -inadequate to the exigencies
and effectiveness of such government. I-tow long an insurrection or a
war may last depends upon its character." (State v. Brown, 71 W.
Va., 519, 525; 33 Ann. Cas., 4.)
"So long as such arrests [without judicial process] are made in
good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to
head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot
be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that
he had not reasonable ground for his belief.

*

*

*

- When

it comes

to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life,
the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the
necessities of the moment." (Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78.)
"No more force, however, can be used than is necessary to accomplish the object. And if the power is exercised for the purposes of
oppression and any injury willfully done to person or property, the
party by whom or by whose order it is committed will undoubtedly be
answerable." (Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 1.)
"It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military p9wer
when the rights of the citizen are concerned shall never be pushed
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beyond what the exigency requires." (Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U. S.,
712.)
During the war of 1812 General Jackson declared martial law
in New Orleans. By his order some of the citizens were arrested for
seditious publications. A writ of habeas corpus was issued and
served on General Jackson, who tore up the writ and sent the judge
by force beyond his lines. Later news was received of the treaty of
peace and martial law revoked. The court issued a process against
Jackson for contempt of court. He came into court personally, submitted to its jurisdiction, and- paid a fine of $1,000. "I have always
been taught to believe that Judge Hall was right in imposing the fine,
and that General Jackson earned the brightest page in his history by
paying it and gracefully submitting to the judicial power. Such I
believe is the judgment of history and of thoughtful judicial inquirers,
though a grateful country very properly refunded to her favorite
general the sum he paid for a necessary but unauthorized exercise of
military power." (Opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, Dow v. Johnson,
100 U. S., 158, 194.)
Military commissions.-"The laws of war constitute much the
greater part of the laws of nations. Like the other laws of nations,
they exist and are of binding force upon the departments and citizens of the Government, though not defined by any law of Congress
* * * It is manifest from what has been said, that military tribunals exist under and according to the laws and usages of war in
the interest of justice and mercy. They are established to save human life, and to prevent cruelty as far as possible. The commander of an army in time of war has the same power to organize
military tribunals and execute their judgments that he has to set
his squadrons in the field and fight battles. His authority in each case
is from the law and usage of war * * * That the laws of war authorized commanders to create and establish military commissions, courts,
or tribunals, for the trial of offenders against the laws of war, whether
they be active or secret participants in the hostilities, can not be denied.
*

*

*

It must be constantly borne in mind that such tribunals

*

*

can not exist except in time of war, and can not then take cognizance of offenders or offences where the civil courts are open, except
offenders and offences against the laws of war * * * The fact that
the civil courts are open does not affect the right of the military tribunal
to hold as a prisoner and to try. The civil courts have no more right to
prevent the military, in time of war, from trying an offender against
the laws of war than they have a right to interfere with and prevent a
*
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See "Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority," published in Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 5, page 718, for criticism of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and other authorities above cited; see also, Johnson v.
Duncan, 3 Martin (La.) 530, 6 Am. Dec. 675, cited in dissenting opinion in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 83, in dissenting opinion in Re Moyer,
12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979, 35 Colo. 159, etc. See also XIV Mich. Law
Rev. 197.
(To be continued.)

